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This paper examines how Islamist publications represent 
the history of Pakistan as a story of betrayal by the country’s 
leaders. These publications emphasize that the very ideology 
which forms the basis of Pakistan has been sidelined. 
I contend that this imagining of an Islamic state is not 
inconsistent with liberal ideology. Through an examination of 
critical histories of Pakistan, I show how these organizations 
are formed within the politics of the postcolonial state. 
Adapting Homi Bhabha’s (1994) theorization of ambivalence, 
I argue that Islamist organizations are actually the ‘slippage’ 
of liberalism in Pakistan. While Islamists call for an Islamic 
system, they imagine change within a legal framework and 
operate within the parameters of the state. In fact, Islamists 
position themselves as intermediaries between liberals and 
militants, attempting to reform the former and integrate the 
latter. Islamists construct an interesting dualism within the 
political arena: on one side, they position the United States 
and subservient Pakistani leaders, and on the other, they place 
militant organizations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) and Tehrik-e-Nafaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). In 
the process, religious organizations become the spokespersons 
for Islamic politics in Pakistan, and the protectors of Islamic 
identity, taking over the role historically occupied by the liberal 
leadership.
2014 Critical Approaches to South Asian Studies Workshop 
Introduction
Talal Asad (2007) asks if there is such a thing as “a religiously 
motivated terrorism? If so, how does it differ from other 
cruelties? What makes its motivation—as opposed to the 
simple intent to kill—religious?” (2007: 1) Adapting this 
question to understand Islamist ideology, one could ask: 
what makes religious demands on nationhood different from 
secular ones? How are these claims based on faith as opposed 
to socio-political realities? In response to his questions on 
violence, Asad asserts that terrorism is a part of “militant 
action in the unequal world we inhabit” (2007: 2) and that 
instead of bifurcating the world into categories of ‘good’ and 
‘evil,’ ‘religious’ and ‘secular,’ we would do well to understand 
terrorism as part of a cycle of violence, alongside modern war, 
that is part of liberalism. Similarly, to write off religious actors 
in Pakistan as part of a clash between religious and secular 
sensibilities within Muslim countries would be to ignore the 
convergence of ideas that takes place amongst these two 
groups.
In this paper, I examine four editorials that appeared in 
different Islamist magazines during the 2009 war between 
the Pakistan Army and militants associated with the Tehrik-
e-Taliban (TTP) and Tehrik-e-Nafaz-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
(TNSM) in Swat and Malakand. By analyzing the writings of 
Islamist organizations – by which I mean groups that espouse 
a role in the political structure and attempt to work within the 
confines of the state – in Pakistan, I show that their discourse 
is not unique to religion; it is part of broader liberal civil 
society narratives about the state, sovereignty and subjectivity.
 
Before I begin, a brief note about my data, and the place of 
Islamist publications in the context of Pakistani media would 
be useful. To put it mildly, the transformation of the media 
landscape in Pakistan since 2000 has been radical. From a 
handful of television channels, the country now has over 90 
stations in English, Urdu and various regional languages, with 
over 20 dedicated to news and current events. The print media 
in this period has grown at a substantially slower rate but 
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What makes religious demands on 
nationhood different from secular 
ones?
has also witnessed the addition of a few daily publications 
in English and Urdu. With the exception of the state-owned 
Pakistan Television (PTV), these channels and publications 
are privately owned and are not controlled by the state. 
However, they are generally critical of militant organizations 
and support the Pakistan Army’s operations in the northern 
areas, while retaining an unflattering opinion of the United 
States and of government in Pakistan. Islamist publications 
do not fall into the category of mainstream media even 
though some newspapers and magazines claim a readership 
of over 100,000 (Rana 2008). The opinions in these 
publications favour an Islamic state and are sympathetic 
toward or even supportive of (depending on their affiliation 
and ideological bent) the mujahideen in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir and militant organizations inside Pakistan. In all, 
there are over 100 newspapers and magazines published 
by various hard-line and more moderate Islamist groups. 
The majority of these are written in Urdu, with a sizable 
number also published in English, Arabic, Persian, Sindhi and 
Pashto (Rana 2008). The publications I analyze in this paper 
were all collected during a fieldwork visit between June and 
August 2009; they are in Urdu and I am responsible for the 
translations. I was able to procure 11 different publications 
(15 issues in all) printed between May and July 2009, which 
include substantial coverage of the war in Malakand and 
Swat1. The articles examined from across these publications 
share thematic similarities and construct similar narratives 
of Pakistani history. I have chosen the four pieces examined 
in this paper because, as editorials, they convey the stance 
of the publication in which they appear, and they exemplify 
how Islamists construct history to outline the failures of the 
Pakistani state. 
In a research paper delivered at the inaugural South Asia 
Research Group (SARG) conference, I examined how rumours 
circulating in Pakistan’s major urban centers centralize Islam 
when constructing the Pakistani subject. In these rumours, 
Pakistan is equated with Islam while those designated 
enemies of the nation are constructed as non-Muslim and 
therefore not Pakistani. Islam is centralized in this discourse, 
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which suggests that piety does not endorse violence and 
obstruct or undermine the operation of the state. At the same 
time, these rumours are concerned with state security and 
progress; they suggest the existence of a homogenous body 
politic, and endorse the legitimacy of the state, including its 
monopoly over violence. The ideas within these rumours 
speak to a more mainstream discourse prevalent in Pakistan 
that is concerned with both the sanctity of Islam and the 
preservation of the modern state. It is my argument that 
this is a liberal discourse emerging from the genealogy of 
the postcolonial Pakistani state. I contend that this liberal 
discourse in Pakistan “continually produces its slippage” 
(Bhabha 1994: 122) and that Islamist organizations and their 
discourse is part of this process.   
Barbara Metcalf (2004) has shown how every Pakistani 
political leader has used an Islamic framework when 
presenting their vision for the nation. Islam has been thought 
of as the most powerful ideological tool with which to unify 
and control the multiple ethnic groups living in the country. 
In the formative years, this discourse was based on an 
opposition to Hindu India, with Pakistan being represented as 
a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. Metcalf argues that 
this changed after the formation of Bangladesh in 1971 when 
Pakistan’s “claim to be a Muslim homeland [was] undercut 
by its reduction to the third largest Muslim population of the 
subcontinent” (2004: 219). At this point, Pakistani leaders such 
as the liberal Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto began identifying with the 
countries of the Middle East to locate Pakistan in a broader 
Islamic history. 
Even before the events of 1971, under the Ayub Khan regime, 
Pakistani historiography was fashioned to “read back into 
the past the self-conscious religious identity of the present” 
(Metcalf 2004: 224), turning conquerors into heroes and 
constructing a narrative where the lost glory of Islam in the 
subcontinent was to be reclaimed. Despite the Ayub regime’s 
rhetoric, its project was a modernist one where Islam did not 
provide a “guide to policies or actions,” it was instead “the 
ultimate interest served by the policies followed” (Metcalf 
4
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 05 No. 05 // 2015
2004: 224). But Islam became central to the language used by 
the regime and was deployed, unsuccessfully, as a means for 
unification and identity building. In the process, the regime’s 
pandering to elite interests led to all regional forms of Islam 
being rejected, further polarizing the country’s various 
ethnic populations. Just as the Urdu language project gave 
prominence to central symbols while marginalizing regional 
cultures, successive liberal and modernist governments have 
both collected and invented a language for Islam in Pakistan 
and attempted to give the state ownership over religion. 
The Pakistani establishment has been invested in building 
a nationalism around Islam since the formation of the state 
in 1947. At the same time, Pakistan was imagined as a 
“secular, liberal democracy” (Metcalf 2004: 1), and has been 
committed to the project of modernity since its inception. 
The engagement with religion has therefore been a liberal 
one, premised on a “modern interpretation of Islam” (Metcalf 
2004: 225) while serving the interests of the country’s elite. 
“For those of the elite committed to a Western-style state 
and technological advancement, religion was to be modern 
too” (Metcalf 2004: 225). While progressive movements have 
historically been curtailed in Pakistan, this has intersected with 
the agendas of the ruling class and the international political 
climate (Toor 2011). State formation in Pakistan, therefore, has 
been a liberal agenda serviced by Islamic rhetoric. 
Islamist organizations have emerged within this push and pull 
between liberal goals and the banner of Islamic unification, 
and attempted to articulate the place of Islam within the 
context of the liberal state. However, the discourse produced 
by these organizations uses the symbols and language of the 
liberal state. When attempting to break into the mainstream 
and appeal to the populace, these organizations have turned 
to the “language of (liberal) democracy, individual rights 
and, most importantly, the nation” (Toor 2011: 106). While 
liberal Pakistani leaders have coated the language of nation 
building with an Islamic veneer, religious organizations have 
latched onto liberal democratic ideals to further their Islamic 
project. Espousing ideals such as liberty, freedom, equality and 
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sovereignty, Islamist organizations are modern in origin and 
make up2.
Homi Bhabha (1994) argues that the mimetic nature of 
colonial discourse attempts to create a reformed and 
identifiable subject. However, by intensifying colonial power 
and surveillance, mimicry “alienates its own language of 
liberty” (123). The “ambivalence” inherent in this discourse 
– the colonial subject is to be “almost the same, but not 
white” (2004: 128) – produces its slippage in the form of 
a subject that is at once incomplete and threatening. “It is 
as if the very nature of the ‘colonial’ is dependant for its 
representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition 
within the authoritative discourse itself” (2004: 123). It is on 
this idea of ‘ambivalence’ and the ‘slippage’ it produces that 
I want to focus here. Pakistani state discourse has always 
been concerned with “the roots of Islamic authority and 
authenticity” (Rozehnal 2011: 118) on the one hand, and 
“modernization and development” (Ewing 1983: 251; also see 
Metcalf 2004; Khan 2006) on the other. This has made for an 
odd mix, with identity construction, at once, appealing to a 
“reified universal Islam” (Rozehnal 2011: 118) based on the 
glorification of Islamic conquerors (Jalal 1995) and to a desired 
“coming modernity” (Khan 2006: 88). But the two ideas are 
given incongruous positions: the state and the subject are to 
be modernized to protect an authentic Islam that must remain 
static and private, the latter being a prerequisite of secularism. 
The postcolonial Pakistani state adopts a colonial logic in 
dealing with the question of religion. In turning Islam into 
a nationalist symbol, the state regulates what constitutes 
religious practice, with all other forms of Islam falling outside 
the realm of acceptability. Achille Mbembe (2001) has 
shown how postcolonial regimes draw their understanding 
of government from variegated knowledges, both colonial 
and pre-colonial, which become entangled in the set up of 
the nascent state. In the case of colonial organization of 
religion in undivided India, this meant “religion emerged as 
a unified cohesive category of identification, and … attained 
a political prominence it had previously lacked” (Iqtidar 
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The postcolonial Pakistani state 
adopts a colonial logic in dealing 
with the question of religion. In 
turning Islam into a nationalist 
symbol, the state regulates what 
constitutes religious practice, with 
all other forms of Islam falling 
outside the realm of acceptability. 
2011: 45). This treatment of Islam as a defined category and 
the resultant emergence of religion in the public sphere has 
carried over into the postcolonial Pakistani state. Religion here 
is conceptualized as historic, authentic and to be preserved 
and kept pure by the state, but practiced in private while the 
public face of the nation is concerned with modernization and 
development. But this duality is met with the irony of religion 
being codified in law and slipping (in its constructed puritanical 
form) into state. 
Islamist organizations, particularly those involved in the 
political process, are produced within this diachrony of 
Pakistani liberal discourse. They emerge from the “limitation” 
of Pakistani liberalism where the state’s modernist ideals and 
Islamic rhetoric coalesce to produce a subjectivity that is split. 
Islamists are engaged in making Islam part of the democratic 
process and facilitating its modernity. This is a continuation of 
the state’s liberal project, which discursively produces religion 
in the public sphere while ensuring its containment within the 
private. Islamists, on the other hand, want to build a religious 
state that is guided by the principles of Islam – whatever 
these might be according to Islamist organizations. Extending 
the state-driven project of protecting Islam, these groups 
want to model society on a religious ethics and morality 
where every citizen is dedicated to building an identity that is 
grounded in faith. They argue that if Pakistan is a nation made 
for Muslims then why is Islam being kept out of the realm of 
governance and social organization. The state has attempted 
to co-opt Islam to further its modernization project, in the 
process dividing the country along lines of class, gender and 
ethnicity, parameters that Islamists groups do not appear 
to be dismantling even though they propagate an ethical 
Islamic nation in their discourse. However, Islamists attempt 
to reformulate the state designation of Islam as a symbol 
into a project where religion can actually be brought to bear 
on questions of community and state organization, making 
Islam relevant to modernity as opposed to placing it in the 
private realm of the sacred. Pakistanis are not simply meant 
to be modern subjects who practice Islam; they must actively 
engage Islam in the process of nation building.  
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Take, for example, the case of Lal Masjid, a mosque-madrassa 
complex that was the focus of a Pakistan Army Operation in 
2007. In response to Lal Masjid activists shutting down music 
stores and kidnapping brothel owners in the nation’s capital, 
the government launched a full-fledged military offensive. 
Faisal Devji (2008) cites the example of the complex’s leader 
Abdul Rashid Ghazi insisting that it is not a ‘conservative’ 
institution since Lal Masjid houses a women’s madrassa. While 
Ghazi did not conceptualize Lal Masjid as conservative, the 
Pakistan government was quick to demolish the “women’s 
seminary once they had occupied the Red Mosque, as if 
trying in this way to reassert the masculine character of 
Muslim religiosity against the militants, who in turn protested 
vociferously against this effort to exclude women from their 
society” (2008: 21). 
What is interesting here is that the Pakistani state, under the 
‘liberal dictatorship’ of General Musharraf (Musharraf used the 
term ‘enlightened moderation’ to describe his rule), targeted 
Lal Masjid’s most inclusive branch for demolition, while 
allowing the mosque itself to be rebuilt after the operation. 
The state therefore affirmed Lal Masjid’s religious aspect 
while denouncing its broader civil society project. While an 
Islamist group championed the rights of women to political 
participation, the state’s actions belied its secular credentials. 
As Islamist organizations assert themselves as political actors, 
in the process they expose the unequal landscape of Pakistani 
liberalism, becoming for the state part “resemblance” and part 
“menace” (Bhabha 1994: 123). I will now turn to examples 
of these liberal politics in Islamist writings by examining four 
editorials from different publications written during Operation 
Black Thunderstorm3.  
The Betrayal of History
An editorial in the June 2009 issue of Ahl-e-Hadith magazine, 
affiliated with the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith organization, focuses 
on how Pakistan’s leaders have adopted a subservient attitude 
toward the United States and cannot differentiate true 
friendships, which are defined as being based on equality, 
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from false ones. Focusing on Pakistan’s relationships with India 
and the United States, the author argues that “Bharat  (India) 
is our eternal enemy” (“Witness Crossing” 2009: 3) creating 
the image of a timeless conflict between the two nations. To 
substantiate this, he alludes to India’s role during the fall of 
Dhaka in 1971 and its actions in Kashmir, quickly shifting focus 
to allegations that the Indian government is involved in the 
conflicts in Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and Swat. Despite this, “President Zardari is thinking of 
it [India] as a friend” (3). Pakistani leaders, the article suggests, 
do not know how to choose their friends, often trusting those 
who are intent on destroying the nation by destabilizing it 
both politically and economically. The author next points to 
the United States: “We want relations with America on an 
equal basis because only on an equal basis can friendships 
be strong” (3). But the article insists that this is not the case 
as the United States is intent on exerting control over, and 
compromising, Pakistan’s sovereignty. The relationship that 
the two nations currently share is based purely on American 
needs. Pakistan’s leaders, the author suggests, are incapable 
of finding friends who they can trust, those who also have 
Pakistan’s interests in mind.  
The editorial then draws a parallel between colonial 
governance and Pakistan’s relationship with the United 
States. “After great sacrifices we got independence. First we 
were subservient to Britain, now America is interfering in 
our internal and external affairs. Our leaders are its obedient 
servants” (3). Independence gained from the colonial power 
is talked about as a sacrifice that promised freedom and an 
honourable future for the Muslims of South Asia, but this 
ideal has been lost in the years that followed. Instead, once 
again due to the timidity of Pakistan’s leaders, the people 
are being denied their rights and freedom – first there was 
subservience to Britain and now America. The article observes 
that during a press conference given by American special 
representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, 
Pakistani President Asif “Zardari stood with his hands folded” 
(3). His posture is taken as representing a “slavish attitude” 
that has “brought shame to Pakistan’s dignity and respect” 
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(3). Here Zardari’s compliance to American whims is likened 
to a comprador, or a brown sahib, doing the bidding of his 
colonial masters at the expense of his own people4. He stands 
with his arms folded, head down, a picture of compliance 
and servitude, working with the United States to undermine 
Pakistan’s sovereignty. The article ends by stating that the 
“need of the moment is to escape American hegemony as 
soon as possible and solve our own problems” (4). The writer 
makes it clear, however, that with leaders like Zardari at the 
helm this will never happen. 
This theme of pusillanimous leaders also appears in Saeed 
Ahmed Jalalpuri’s editorial in Khatm-e-Nubuwwat magazine 
(affiliated with the organization of the same name and printed 
in Karachi) alongside the idea that Pakistan as a nation has 
been moving toward its demise since Partition because of the 
leadership’s failure to build a nation in the name of Islam5. 
Jalalpuri (2009) writes that the country’s “beauty and grace 
is diminishing day by day,” alluding to the passage of time, 
in which the hopes and expectations of “Muslims [who] 
sacrificed their lives” (5) to form Pakistan have been trampled 
on. History has witnessed the decaying of this nation and in 
the “62 years [that] have passed since Pakistan was founded 
… it has not reached even one step toward its goals” (5). 
Instead, in the time it has existed as a country, Pakistan has 
already been “split into two, and in the remaining dim piece, 
those dancing to the tunes of strangers have played such 
games the thought of which would make your hair stand on 
ends” (5). Jalalpuri mentions two historical events in this 
article – Partition and the formation of Bangladesh. These are 
significant in that they both mark a geographical split, the first 
forming Pakistan itself and the second reducing its size and 
marking the formation of a new country. Pakistan was created 
out of sacrifice, out of chaos – a region of the world had to 
be divided to make it possible for this country to exist – but in 
its short history, one which should have been memorable in 
terms of growth and the realization of ambitious goals, it has 
been defined by more chaos, more breakage and now, possibly 
the dissolution of what is left over. This is how Jalalpuri 
constructs the history of Pakistan. 
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But why did this happen, Jalalpuri asks. His answer indicts the 
leaders that have come, gone and are still around. Phrases 
such as “those dancing to the tune of strangers” suggest 
that the “ruling lords” (2009: 6) have carried out the worst 
kind of betrayal. They are the ones responsible for Pakistan’s 
economic fortunes, “burdened” as it is “with heavy debts” 
as well as a “shortage of water and electricity” and now the 
refugee crisis caused by the Swat operation that has rendered 
“two and a half to three [million] people homeless” (2009: 
6). In what appears to be a rather ironic suggestion, Jalalpuri 
places hope for the future in the hands of these same leaders: 
“May God instill some sense into the ruling masters that they 
refrain from this cruelty and barbarism” (2009: 6). When read 
in the context of the article, however, this statement reveals 
that the leadership’s first and most significant mistake was to 
turn their backs on the founding purpose of Pakistan, a nation 
made in the name of “Islam and Islamic system” (2009: 5). By 
betraying the purpose of the nation – a country for Muslims 
achieved through the sacrifices made by “sincere Muslims” 
(2009: 5) – these leaders allowed Pakistan to become a victim 
of foreign viruses while they themselves have been infected 
by greed. The body metaphor runs throughout Jalalpuri’s 
narrative, bringing to mind the idea of a disease spreading: 
first the leaders, who gave in to greed, were infected and then 
the nation, too, became sick. 
Pakistan’s history is once again presented as the failure of its 
leaders in Al-Mimbar magazine, with the author arguing that 
those in power have acted as if they are above the law and 
regularly succumbed to the will of external forces. The writer 
asks a historical question centered on the Swat operation 
at the beginning of the article: “Which of our mistakes have 
spoilt conditions to this extent that we have no other choice 
but to keep spilling blood?” (“Whips Raining” 2009: 4). The 
answer points to a corrupt and self-interested leadership: 
“obedience, flattery and slavery [is in] their nature” and they 
are willing to sell “Pakistan’s interests” (4) to America. The 
use of the word “slavery” and the phrase “slavish attitude” 
to describe the actions of the government once again evokes 
the memory of colonialism. As was the case with the editorial 
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from Ahl-e-Hadith magazine discussed earlier in this section, 
Pakistan’s leaders are still intent on serving a western master. 
They are unable to conceive of Pakistan as a sovereign state 
that needs to represent the interests of its own people, 
instead they continue to acts as compradors – the author 
uses the phrase “continuous slavish attitude,” drawing a 
genealogical connection between these leaders and the ones 
who served before them – eager to barter the nation and turn 
“everything upside down for personal gain” (4).
This history of betrayal allows the author to create and 
reawaken old memories and place them alongside the events 
taking place in Swat. The image he constructs through this 
combining of the past and the present is one of the death of a 
national ethos, something that has been in the works since the 
creation of Pakistan. He argues that the nation’s “ideology has 
been sacrificed” to serve external interests instead of fostering 
the Pakistan that was “created in the name of Islam” (2009: 
4). What is being suggested here, when these two statements 
are taken together, is that a particular historical trajectory was 
supposed to be followed and bring to fruition an Islamic state 
in accordance with the will of the people. The use of the word 
“ideology” is reminiscent of Abul ala’ Mawdudi’s conception of 
Pakistan becoming an ideological state6.  
For Mawdudi, the state was to be built on a moral code 
drawn from Islam, and the values, beliefs and principles of 
each individual would be a mirror of the state. There would, 
in other words, be no incongruence between the ideology 
of the individual and the state (Mawdudi 1955). In the Al-
Mimbar editorial the implication is that since this ideological 
state was not created, the very essence of what Pakistan and 
its people represent and value was betrayed and trampled 
on by an obsequious leadership. By betraying the meaning of 
Pakistan, the “ideology” that binds the nation and its people, 
the leadership has stunted its development and not allowed 
an actual nation to emerge. Instead, what now exists is 
reminiscent of the colony that preceded it: a land controlled 
and operated by the United States through local leaders (once 
again we see the appearance of the comprador/brown sahib 
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 05 No. 05 // 2015
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theme) imbued with a “slavish attitude”. 
In an editorial for the Chasm-e-Baidar magazine, the writer 
argues that Pakistan’s “experiments” with democracy have 
revealed that this system of government is “an enemy of the 
people” (“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). Once again, history, 
as the passage of time, is brought up to support this claim. 
The use of the word “experiments” suggests that democracy 
has been implemented on numerous occasions throughout 
the country’s history. But on each occasion, “the masses [have 
been] duped [and] … [m]oney earned through sweat and 
blood by the masses is snatched and given to the elite” (5). 
The author reviews Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government in the 
1970s and those of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 
1990s, stating that these were driven by greed and corruption, 
and benefited only the nation’s elite classes. Democracy is 
therefore a system instituted to exploit the masses and serve 
the interests of the ruling classes. After moving from Pakistan’s 
democratic history to a series of global examples such as 
the violence against Muslims in Gujarat to America’s wars 
in Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, etc., and contemporary 
cases of discrimination against Muslims in Europe, the author 
terms democracy worse than blasphemy: 
The theme of betrayal comes across in socio-economic terms 
in these passages and once again the country’s leaders are 
responsible for the oppression of the people. Even though the 
author focuses on democracy and the rule of elected leaders, 
it is clear that the military elite is also included in the category 
of the ruling classes – army generals are mentioned as getting 
rich off this systematic inequality and the Musharraf regime is 
lumped in with democratic governments. But along with the 
population, the very idea of what Pakistan should have stood 
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If a system does not provide justice … education, 
health and other basic necessities … then it is worse 
than a blasphemous system wherein at least these 
necessities are being provided … the burden of the 
rulers debauchery has been put on the masses and the 
elite have been pampered, that is why it is not only not 
Islamic but worse than blasphemy and an anti-people 
system (“Present Democracy” 2009: 5).
for has once again been betrayed: “If this democracy had been 
kept under God’s codes (which is Islamic system) then without 
doubt it would have been a blessing for humanity because … it 
would have provided justice without discrimination, stopped 
tyranny and force and looked after basic human rights” 
(“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). 
In asserting that an Islamic system – which is in no way defined 
in this or any of the other articles – would have provided 
“human rights” and curtailed all the distress brought on by 
democracy, the author suggests that a great mistake was 
made in Pakistan’s history. Had Pakistan’s leaders adhered 
to the path laid out for the country, had they chosen to 
govern according to an Islamic system, then they would 
not have fallen victim to corruption and the nation would 
have prospered. But the article does not dismiss the idea of 
democratic participation or the structure of a democratic 
set up altogether. Instead, the author asks for democracy to 
be instituted according to “God’s code, which is an Islamic 
system”, suggesting that democracy guided by Islam can “stop 
tyranny” and provide “human rights” (“Present Democracy” 
2009: 5).   
The dominant narrative in these texts is that the nation’s 
history is one of betrayal, both by the local leadership and 
foreign nations posing as friends. Pakistan is conceptualized 
as a nation created in the name of Islam and, by extension, 
for Muslims. This historical vision remains unrealized due 
to post-Partition leaders who have “sold” the nation on 
countless occasions and acted purely in self-interest. They 
have even made slaves of themselves, regularly capitulating 
to the whims of the United States instead of asserting the 
sovereignty of their own nation. This is seen as reminiscent 
of subservience to colonialism, and now the leaders have 
retained this attitude in their dealings with the United States. 
In the Islamist narrative of history: where great sacrifices were 
made to found a country out of the ignominy of colonialism, 
where there was once the promise of a nation that could 
take its place in the history of nations, there is now Pakistan, 
unfinished, in turmoil and slowly fading. 
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This historical vision remains 
unrealized due to post-Partition 
leaders who have “sold” the nation 
on countless occasions and acted 
purely in self-interest. They have 
even made slaves of themselves, 
regularly capitulating to the whims 
of the United States instead of 
asserting the sovereignty of their 
own nation. 
By tracing the past, isolating moments of breakage and 
destruction, the articles try to identify what went wrong 
and how it can be repaired. The cover story of Azaan-e-Fajr 
magazine states exactly this: “History is a mirror in which 
people and nations can see a glimpse of their abilities and 
shortcomings. They can inspect in detail the rise and fall of 
their ancestors. In light of these facts, they can chart a course 
for their future” (“We Have to Decide” 2009: 24). An Islamic 
system represents the potential of Pakistan, it is what the 
country was founded for and only through its institution 
can the nation take its place in history. The editorials, as 
well as the vast majority of my fieldwork data from Islamist 
circles, position an Islamic system as one which guarantees 
human rights and equality. This system is turned into the 
true embodiment of liberal politics – as the editorial writer 
in Chasm-e-Baidar argues, keeping the democratic system 
within god’s code “would have provided justice without 
discrimination, stopped tyranny and force, and looked after 
basic human rights” (“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). It is 
through an Islamic political set up that Pakistan will reach its 
“goal” (Jalalpuri 2009: 5) and achieve its desired modernity. 
Since Pakistan’s inception, the leaderships’ greatest failure, 
therefore, constitutes a betrayal of history itself. 
Liberalism’s Interlocutors: The Islamist Intermediary
All four editorials work within the established parameters of 
the state and demonstrate a concern for its development. The 
country’s leaders are chastised for not facilitating progress 
and allowing foreign powers (the external enemy as opposed 
to the enemy within) to gain control over Pakistan; progress 
and state development are essential markers of the nation’s 
success. While the articles suggest that an Islamic system is 
the way forward for Pakistan, their use of the language of 
progress, citizen representation, institutional development, 
and state sovereignty, points to a real investment in the 
process of democracy and modernity. Humeira Iqtidar 
(2011) has shown how Islamist organizations potentially 
open up conceptual space for the secularization of Pakistani 
society. She separates secularization from secularism to 
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show that the former involves the incorporation of religion 
into society and its subsequent rationalization. While these 
organizations do not consciously identify with secularism, 
“they are secularizing, that is, they are facilitating a process 
of secularization as rationalization of religion” (2011: 22). 
Precisely by bringing religion into the public sphere, the 
Islamists open the debate on how religion fits into modern life, 
a dialogue the Pakistani state has largely avoided by insisting 
that Islam is the moral code unifying all Pakistanis. 
Secularism is often simply understood as the separation of 
church and state. A fuller understanding shows how secularism 
is about the management of religion by the state (Asad 2003), 
making it a part of the liberal mode of governance where 
individuals and communities are to be regulated for the 
collective good. The Pakistani state’s current engagement with 
Islam is focused on its management and limiting its spillover 
into the public sphere. The Islamist push to make religion 
public might appear to be the antithesis of secularism but 
this demand is actually about how to manage religion in the 
context of the state. In this process, religion is made into a 
subject of debate as opposed to a sacred belief that requires 
protection. Faisal Devji (2005) has shown a similar irony in 
his analysis of the disparate entities that comprise the global 
Al-Qaeda led ‘Jihad’. They democratize Islam through a global 
nexus of participation, reinterpretation, and “fragmentation 
of traditional structures of Muslim authority” (xvi). Islamists 
who oppose the jihad reinforce the position of the state, 
legitimizing its authority to moderate religion, thus, Devji 
argues, becoming more liberal.  
Pakistan’s Islamist organizations therefore respond to both 
local conditions – this would be the unarticulated place of 
Islam in the nation’s modernity – and to the global context 
of the jihad, which pushes these organizations more into 
the mainstream and away from any aspirations of radical 
opposition. The articles on the Operation Black Thunderstorm 
provide a comprehensive understanding of Islamist discourse 
and subjectivity precisely because they respond to both 
the affects of the global affects of Al-Qaeda’s jihad and 
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The Islamist push to make religion 
public might appear to be the 
antithesis of secularism but this 
demand is actually about how to 
manage religion in the context of 
the state. In this process, religion 
is made into a subject of debate 
as opposed to a sacred belief that 
requires protection. 
political conditions within the Pakistani state. While militant 
organizations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan 
are opposed to the state and endorse violence against the 
government, the Islamists are invested in its reform and do not 
call for violence against the state itself. According to Jalalpuri 
(2009), the “source of unity” in Pakistan is a combination of 
“faith, religion, country and nation” (5), and the fortunes of 
the people are tied to its prosperity. And unlike the liberals, 
they want to make Islam part of the public sphere, locating 
in religion the moral guidelines to deal with inequality and 
civil unrest: “If this democracy had been kept under God’s 
codes (which is Islamic system) then without doubt it would 
have … provided justice without discrimination, stopped 
tyranny and force, and looked after basic human rights” 
(“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). In opposing militants as well 
as liberal state organization, Islamists position themselves 
as intermediaries between the two groups. In the process, 
however, their discourse becomes more liberal as it attempts 
to merge opposing groups under the umbrella of the state, 
simultaneously guaranteeing inclusion and repression. 
While they champion the language of human rights and 
equality, Islamists intend to fortify the disciplinary apparatuses 
of the state. Their discourse involves the same ambivalent 
notion of liberty outlined in Bhabha’s (1994) analysis of 
colonial discourse. Jalalpuri (2009) writes that the country’s 
Muslims can be united via fear of god and the government, 
and love of the faith and nation. This statement contains 
all the elements of a disciplinary system of power where 
the state governs its subjects through a “regime of truth” 
(Foucault 1972: 131). In Al-Mimbar: “The writ of the state 
should be everywhere, from top to bottom, from north to 
south, from east to west” (“Whips Raining” 2009: 4). And in 
Chasm-e-Baidar: “the labourers need justice and fair play, 
security of life and property” (“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). 
Here, the state’s right to control the population and enforce 
justice through security is validated and upheld. The TTP and 
Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) are seen as 
overstepping the boundaries of dissent and are therefore 
legitimate targets of the state’s disciplinary apparatus. 
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“Sufi Mohammad [leader of the TNSM] and his aides should 
have remained within their limits,” reads the editorial in Al-
Mimbar, which goes on to say that the TNSM and TTP have 
“knowingly or unknowingly come in the way of providing 
law and justice to the people of Pakistan” (“Whips Raining” 
2009: 5). In Chasm-e-Baidar the author argues that the TNSM 
has misunderstood the issue: it is not a battle between Islam 
and “paganism,” instead it is an “issue of basic human rights” 
(“Present Democracy” 2009: 5). And in Khatm-e-Nubuwwat, 
Jalalpuri (2009) writes that the Pakistan Army is killing citizens 
while allowing the “troublemakers”(6) to operate freely 
in Swat, suggesting that the Taliban are indeed enemies 
of the state but the Pakistan government is too corrupt to 
effectively clean house. Even as the articles condemn militant 
organizations, their authors manage to connect militant 
violence to the historic failures of Pakistan’s leadership and its 
capitulation to American demands. They hold the government 
and the militants equally responsible for the conflict, which 
itself is situated within the violence of imperialism. 
For this reason, Islamists seek to bring militant groups within 
the purview of government while removing the Pakistani state 
from the global sphere of American influence. The trappings 
of imperialism are identified as historical and contemporary 
causes of militancy and dysfunction in Pakistani governance. 
Hence, a peace agreement could not be implemented in Swat 
because the TNSM did not stay “within their limits” and the 
“liberal, secular and sectarian classes” (“Whips Raining” 2009: 
4), as well as the media, were opposed to an entente. These 
animosities were exploited by Pakistan’s “external enemies 
[who] cannot bear peace in our country in any way” (“Whips 
Raining” 2009: 5). What the warring parties do not understand 
is that they actually need to cooperate and ensure that 
Pakistan escapes “American hegemony as soon as possible” 
(“Witness Crossing” 2009: 4). The question of sovereignty 
is central to the establishment of peace: only through self-
determination can the Pakistani state mediate internal conflict 
and move beyond being a mere “puppet” (“Witness Crossing” 
2009: 4). 
Islamists centralize the state as the institution they want to 
preserve and through which they intend to achieve their 
political goals. It is the state that an Islamic system is meant 
to develop both on a spiritual and moral level, and on an 
economic and institutional one. Jalalpuri talks about the 
refugee crisis being a drain on the country’s economic and 
monetary resources; in Ahl-e-Hadith, the author begins with 
the socio-economic costs of India controlling water flow 
in Kashmir; and the editorial in Chasm-e-Baidar deals with 
the corrupt allocation of taxes. These arguments highlight a 
concern with economic factors and development amongst 
Islamist organizations. For this reason, the Islamists are 
opposed to the project of the militant organizations and 
condemn their actions. That Islamists have supported the 
Taliban in Afghanistan in the past, for instance, and this is 
only an example of their entanglement with the country’s 
liberal institutions – the latter too have favored militancy as 
a strategic foreign policy tool (Hussain 2007; Mamdani 2004; 
Rashid 2000; Shahzad 2011). Their opposition to liberals, on 
the other hand, is singularly based on the place of religion in 
politics – i.e. the project of secularism. 
In all other respects, Islamists mirror liberal ideals: the 
modernization of the country; institutional control of the 
populace; protection of private property; the states sovereign 
status, etc. Pakistan’s Islamist organizations operate within 
the parameters of liberalism while disavowing the category. 
They are the product of postcolonial liberalism in Pakistan, a 
split subject that is, “almost the same, but not quite” (Bhabha 
1994: 122).  
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ENDNOTES
1 The magazines and newspapers collected are: Azan-e-Fajr, 
Takbeer, Mahod, Zarb-e-Momin, Al-Haq, Ahl-e-Hadith, Chasm-
e-Baidar, Al-Misbah, Al-Mimbar, Al-Qalam and Khatm-e-
Nubuwwat.
2 John Gray (2007) has argued that Al-Qaeda is a modern 
organization and has little to do with Islam or pre-modern 
ideas. Its violence challenges the state, demands social change 
and is a tactic and concept that belongs specifically to the 
modern world. Faisal Devji (2005), meanwhile, has shown 
how the organizations that comprise the global jihad fragment 
and reorganize the systems of authority present in the Islamic 
world. He has shown how these groups go beyond the more 
conservative, statist approach of traditional Islamist groups. 
It would therefore be incorrect to categorize Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates as pre-modern. State-based Islamist organizations 
are similarly a response to the excess and dark chapters of 
modernity that have most severely affected what is now the 
third world (Metcalf 2004). Their origins and ambitions, and 
the ways that they deal with religion, make them modern 
organizations. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are an extension of 
Islamist politics, challenging certain ideas of authority, while 
maintaining other practices of exclusion and purity.
3 Operation Black Thunderstorm was a military offensive by 
the Pakistan Army carried out from April to December 2009 to 
retake control of the Buner, Lower Dir, Swat and Shangla areas 
in Pakistan from the Taliban.
4 This is a fairly common term in Pakistan, originally used to 
describe the Indian elite that was loyal to the British colonizer. 
It now denotes westernized Pakistanis who display cultural 
values and ideological aspirations that are seen as English and 
more recently American.
5 Jalalpuri, who was assassinated at Karachi on 11 March 
2010, was the leader of the Almi Majlis Tahaffuz-e-Khatm-e-
Nubuwwat, an organization dedicated to uniting Muslims all 
over the world to “safeguard the sanctity of prophet hood and 
the finality of prophet hood” (“Introduction to Majlis” n.d.).
6 Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, is a renowned and 
influential scholar of Islam who imagined Pakistan becoming 
an ideological state.
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This paper is a part of a collection of selected papers from the 
2014 Critical Approaches to South Asian Studies Workshop, 
organized by the South Asia Research Group at York University. 
Methodologically diverse and locating themselves in a multi-
plicity of sites, these papers challenge the borders of ‘South 
Asia’ and expand the concerns addressed within, including: 
challenging US hegemony through an Islamist critique of liber-
al citizenship in Pakistan, queering the heteropatriarchal family 
in India, critiquing exclusionary statist narratives of peace 
and transitional justice in Sri Lanka, and examining the Indian 
state’s responses to subjects who trouble borders both physi-
cal and legal - Naxals in the 1960s and female migrant domes-
tic workers in the Gulf today. These papers are written by both 
graduate and undergraduate students, and represent exciting 
works in progress within the field of South Asian studies.
The South Asia Research Group (SARG) aims to bring together 
researchers with an interest in South Asia and its diaspora, and 
build a network for the exchange of ideas and resources. It or-
ganizes the annual Critical Approaches to South Asian Studies
Workshop, as well as lectures, movie screenings, and             
academic and non-academic events for York and the broader        
community.
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